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     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A95-864-061
(U.S. Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 11, 2006
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed   January 31, 2007 )
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Yan Yun Qiu petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ June 2,
2005, order denying her motion to reopen her case.  We will deny the petition and affirm
the BIA’s order.
2I. 
Qiu, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States without being
inspected by an immigration officer in August 2001.  In June 2002, she filed an asylum
application contending she had been persecuted on account of her political opinion, she
had been forced by Chinese authorities to have an abortion in 1999, and she would be
fined, jailed, and tortured by the Chinese government for her illegal departure if she
returned to China.  At a hearing before an Immigration Judge in October 2002, Qiu
conceded her removability.  At a hearing in November 2003, another IJ denied Qiu’s
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture.  The IJ ordered Qiu removed to China.
In her November 6, 2003 decision, the IJ stated Qiu’s entire application hinged on
whether Qiu could credibly show she was subjected to a forced abortion in China in 1999. 
In support of that contention, Qiu submitted a September 18, 2002 letter from a certified
nurse midwife indicating Qiu had given birth to a daughter in the United States and had
reported having a pregnancy forcibly terminated in China on August 13, 1999.  The IJ
also considered a 1998 State Department report, China: Profile of Asylum Claims and
Country Conditions.  The IJ found Qiu’s contention lacked credibility because her
account was inconsistent with the Profile and not supported by sufficient evidence, and
because she found Qiu not forthcoming about who had paid to have her smuggled into the
United States.  The IJ also declined to exercise her discretion in Qiu’s favor, stating there
3was no evidence either that Qiu would be forbidden from having a second child if
deported to China, or that Qiu and her husband even wanted to have more children.  The
IJ also stated Qiu had mentioned no fear of torture in the form of sterilization if deported
to China, and any such contention would have been unsupported because Qiu only had
one child.
Qiu appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA on November 28, 2003.  On February 14,
2005, the BIA affirmed without opinion.  On March 18, 2005, Qiu filed a motion to
reopen, in support of which she attached her marriage certificate and the birth certificate
of her second child, a son (born in the United States on March 2, 2005).  On June 2, 2005,
the BIA issued a per curiam order denying the motion to reopen.  The BIA found Qiu had
failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum because her motion was not
accompanied by evidence to support her fear of persecution in China as a result of the
birth of children in the United States.  Furthermore, the BIA found the Profile did not
“reflect a national policy by the Chinese government regarding the application of its
coercive population control policies to parents of foreign-born children” or “establish that
any sanctions that have been imposed on parents of foreign-born children at the local
level rise to the level of persecution.”  (A.R. 2.)  Qiu petitions for review of the BIA’s
order.
The BIA had jurisdiction over Qiu’s motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). 
We have jurisdiction over her timely petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
      The BIA “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has1
made out a prima facie case for relief.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2006).
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Motions to reopen are granted “only under compelling circumstances.”  Guo v.
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004).  The Supreme Court has noted the Attorney
General has broad discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen, and that they are
“disfavored . . . .  This is especially true in a deportation proceeding, where, as a general
matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes to remain
in the United States.”  INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).  Accordingly, we review
the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, and will only disturb the BIA’s
decision if it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law.  Guo, 386 F.3d at 562.
II.
Qiu contends the BIA erred as a matter of law by applying an erroneous burden of
proof standard to determine whether she had made a prima facie showing of a well-
founded fear of persecution.  Specifically, Qiu contends the BIA “required Qiu to prove
that there exists a pattern or practice of persecution of persons situated similarly to
herself, rather than showing a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of proving such a claim.”  (Petr.’s
Br. 5.)  An individual seeking to have his or her immigration proceedings reopened by the
BIA is required to make a prima facie case of eligibility for asylum.  Caushi v. Attorney
General, 436 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 2006).   In order to make a case for asylum, the1
applicant must both “establish[]” that there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution on
      Forced abortion and forced sterilization constitute persecution on account of political2
opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
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account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion of persons similarly situated to the applicant in the applicant’s home country, and
“establish[]” his or her own inclusion in and identification with that group of persons
“such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is reasonable.”  8 C.F.R. §
1208.13(b)(2)(iii) (2006).   A prima facie case of eligibility for asylum “‘requires the2
applicant to produce objective evidence showing a reasonable likelihood that he can
establish [that he is entitled to relief].’” Guo, 386 F.3d at 563 (quoting Sevoian v.
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 173 (3d Cir. 2002) (alterations in original)).
Qiu contends the BIA engaged in “subterfuge” and held her motion to an
excessively rigid standard, requiring her to make the ultimate showing of eligibility for
asylum, rather than a prima facie showing.  Qiu relies heavily on Guo, in which we found
the BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen.  See 386 F.3d at 564.  In Guo
the BIA had stated the petitioner “ha[d] not established a well-founded fear that a
reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution.”  Id. at 563 (emphasis
added).  We accordingly found the BIA had improperly required the petitioner to
“proceed to the end-game” of establishing eligibility for asylum, id. at 564, instead of
only requiring a prima facie showing of eligibility.  In contrast, the BIA’s order here
stated Qiu had “failed to demonstrate that she is prima facie eligible for asylum.”  (A.R.
62.) (emphasis added).  “Agency action is entitled to a presumption of regularity.” 
Kamara v. Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202, 212 (3d Cir. 2005).  Qiu’s arguments are
insufficient to overcome that presumption and show the BIA held Qiu’s motion to reopen
to a higher burden of proof standard than what is required for a prima facie showing.  The
BIA did not abuse its discretion.
Qiu also contends the BIA acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by failing to
fully consider evidence in the record, principally evidence in the Profile on coercive
population control practices by the Chinese government, in light of her having two
children born in the United States.  Qiu initially cites the Profile in support of a prima
facie showing of eligibility for asylum based on persecution in the form of coercive
population control practices such as forced abortion and sterilization, as well as
persecution in the form of economic deprivation, particularly because Qiu has two
children born in the United States.  But she also criticizes the Profile’s currency and
accuracy.  Again, Qiu relies heavily on Guo, in which we found the BIA abused its
discretion in finding the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to make a prima facie case of
eligibility for asylum.  See 386 F.3d at 559.  Again, that reliance is misplaced.  In Guo, we
noted proof of a well-founded fear of persecution entails both subjective and objective
inquiries, and the petitioner had provided as evidence of the objective element an
affidavit from a specialist on Chinese demographic developments and population policy,
      The petitioner in Guo also attached to her motion to reopen the following: a previous3
BIA decision in favor of a similarly-situated Chinese applicant; a copy of her second
asylum application (which claimed fear of persecution in the form of forced abortion or
sterilization, whereas her original asylum application had claimed fear of religious
persecution); the birth certificate of one child born after the BIA’s initial determination,
as well as a letter from an obstetrician describing her current pregnancy; and a marriage
certificate.  386 F.3d at 560.  Moreover, our grant of Guo’s petition was based in part on
the fact that the BIA’s rejection of her motion to reopen had relied on an IJ’s adverse
credibility finding on Guo’s claimed fear of religious persecution (in support of her first
asylum application).  Whereas Qiu’s motion to reopen is premised on essentially the same
facts (save the birth of her son) and arguments as her original application for asylum,
Guo’s motion to reopen was premised on a new set of facts and theory of persecution.
      In Guo, we also agreed with the petitioner that the Profile might “buttress her prima4
facie case.”  386 F.3d at 566.  But the affidavit was Guo’s primary evidence, and Qiu
cannot rely solely on the Profile here to make a prima facie showing.
      The BIA in In re C– C–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 899 (2006), has persuasively argued against5
further reliance on the Aird affidavit where petitioners for asylum contend they will be
subject to persecution in the form of forced abortion or sterilization in China for having
foreign-born children.  As the BIA notes, Aird (who retired from the Census Bureau more
than twenty years ago and died in October 2005) did not base his affidavit on personal
knowledge, but rather on documents mainly from the 1980s and 1990s that are in conflict
(continued...)
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John Aird.   Id. at 565–66.  We termed the affidavit’s critique of the Profile “Guo’s3
principal evidence” on coercive population control practices in China, and concluded that
“where a motion to reopen is accompanied by substantial support of the character
provided by the . . . affidavit,” the BIA’s reliance on the Profile is insufficient to
undermine a petitioner’s prima facie showing.   Id. at 565.  Qiu provides nothing in4
support of her motion that is comparable to that affidavit.  In any event, reliance on the
“oft-cited Aird affidavit,” Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006), in a case such
as Qiu’s has been undermined by the BIA.   The only new fact Qiu presented in support5
     (...continued)5
with the more recent 2005 State Department report on conditions in China.  Id. at 901–02. 
Further, the Aird affidavit “only briefly discusses” the State Department’s 2004 report “as
it relates to citizens returning to China with foreign-born children.”  Id. at 201; see also
Wang, 437 F.3d at 275, 274 (noting the Aird affidavit had been submitted in more than
200 cases since 1993, and rejecting reliance on it where the affidavit “was not prepared
specifically for petitioner and is not particularized as to his circumstances”).
      Qiu also attached a copy of her marriage certificate, but the IJ and the BIA were6
already aware of the marriage.
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of her motion was the birth of her son, which the BIA took into consideration.   The fact6
that Qiu has two foreign-born children is not sufficient for her to make a prima facie
showing of asylum eligibility.  As the Supreme Court has noted, BIA determinations are
to be upheld if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence, and
reversed only if “the evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it.” 
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).  The record evidence considered by
the BIA in denying Qiu’s motion to reopen compels no such conclusion.  We conclude
the BIA fully considered the record evidence and did not abuse its discretion.
III.
We will deny the petition and affirm the BIA’s order.
